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Abstract 
In the last decades, urban freight deliveries (UFD) have raised considerably. Freight vehicles hamper mobility, slowing down the 
traffic and sometimes double parking. In general, UFD coincides with peak-hour traffic, because deliveries have to be made during 
business hours. 
Some cities worldwide have adopted actions aimed to reduce freight vehicles circulating in peak-hours, but such actions usually 
come up against the receivers, who are not willing to change how they receive their goods. 
This paper shows the main results of a project carried out in two Spanish cities, a big-sized city (Barcelona) and a medium-sized 
one (Santander), about the receiver’s will to adopt new delivery policies. In particular, an off-peak deliveries (OPD) policy and an 
urban distribution centers (UDC) policy have been analyzed. Subsequently, these results will be compared with those obtained in 
NYC for OPD. 
Through a stated preference survey, we have investigated how each variable of these policies influence the receiver’s decision. As 
a result, we developed a different freight policy choice model for each city. To build the models, we used a mixed logit model 
considering repeated observations (panel data) and taste variations. 
In the light of the results obtained, the receivers are more willing to adopt an UDC policy, especially in Barcelona, whose receivers 
oppose firmly OPD. 
As expected, the incentives strongly influence receivers to adopt these policies; however, this influence is quite more important in 
certain business sectors, such as food (for OPD in Barcelona), restaurant and hotel, and furniture (for UDC in Santander and 
Barcelona, respectively). This goes along the lines of the results from NYC, where there are seven sectors more sensitive to the 
incentives. 
Therefore, it is possible to achieve a behavioral change in UFD, by combining these policies and targeting the incentives on 
specific business sectors in order to achieve better results. 
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1. Introduction 
Over recent years greater or lesser success has been achieved in trying to improve goods distribution in urban areas. 
Among the more noteworthy policies are those aimed at promoting the use of collaborative transport systems and 
those trying to reduce heavy vehicle traffic at rush hours. 
The policies promoting the use of collaborative distribution systems try to reduce the number of required journeys 
and increase average vehicle load factors (which are generally around 30-40%), by looking for collaboration between 
companies. The use of cooperative transport systems has been studied for many decades in spite of the practical 
difficulties involved in finding agreements between different companies. Research carried out by the Tri-State 
Transportation Commission in 1970 (Wood, 1970) indicated that the use of cooperative systems would result in a 12% 
reduction in overall operating costs, 50% in parking time and 90% in round trip time. In spite of the difficulties, there 
have been some noteworthy successful collaborations between companies for urban goods distribution, such as in 
Fukuoka, Japan (Ieda et al., 2001), Fribourg, Switzerland (Kohler, 2001), Kassel and Munich, Germany. 
An initial example of a collaborative system is the joint delivery service (JDS), by which a group of carriers create 
a neutral company whose job it is to carry out the final mile in the goods distribution chain. This solution increases 
vehicle usage and at the same time shortens journeys (see fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Deliveries to an urban centre without JDS (a) and with JDS (b) (Holguín-Veras et al., 2007) 
Research carried out to evaluate the efficiency of JDS (Kawamura and Lu, 2008) has found that its use is only 
profitable when there are high densities of traffic and small vehicles are used. Therefore, to encourage companies to 
take up these solutions they must be given incentives. 
The policies aimed at encouraging some goods vehicles to use alternative timetables rather than typical commercial 
hours are a result of distribution vehicles being an important factor in urban traffic congestion at rush hours. Although 
some cities such as Beijing have introduced a total ban on goods transport during the day time this has only moved the 
problem from the day to the night, the best solutions have been found to be those which transfer a large percentage of 
the distribution vehicles to off peak traffic periods. 
The most used policy is generally that of goods distribution at night time. Some successful policies have been 
introduced in cities as populous as New York, where a pilot test carried out in Manhattan found reductions in journey 
times of over 6% with 10% of the carriers taking part (Holguín-Veras et al., 2011). Furthermore, substantial 
improvements are found in urban traffic congestion and environmental pollution, resulting in an increase in the 
economic competitively of the towns and cities involved. 
Although these policies have frequently been adopted to reduce the traffic congestion caused by the circulation of 
goods vehicles at rush hour, it is also important to consider the point of view of the receivers who usually oppose 
these policies because they are unwilling to change the way they receive their goods. 
This paper aims to analyse the differences in the behaviour of the receivers in response to new urban goods 
distribution policies, using a model to predict the change in receivers’ attitude. These changes do not only depend on 
the characteristics of each policy but also on the type of business being affected. 
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Two policies will be studied, both aimed at avoiding the circulation of delivery vehicles at rush hour: night time 
distribution and the use of urban goods distribution centres. These policies will then be compared with the results 
obtained in NYC using OPD. 
An initial selection is made of the main variables affecting each of the policies being studied and a stated 
preferences survey is then asked to the retailers in order to analyse their predisposition to accept each of the policies. 
The results of the surveys will be used to calibrate a mixed Logit model considering repeated observations (panel 
data) and interactions with the type of business being affected by the policies being studied. This model will allow the 
later study of how the businesses behave as a result of changes made to urban goods distribution policies. The creation 
of the model will be followed by simulating the two systems for urban goods distribution to estimate the importance 
of each variable on the decisions made by the businesses. The results obtained for Santander and Barcelona will then 
be compared with those found in NYC to find if there are any similarities and differences. 
This paper is structured in the following way: section 2 provides a detailed description of the analysis carried out, 
explaining the policies and the most important variables, as well as explaining how the stated preferences surveys 
were designed. Section 3 describes the calibration of the model for predicting the behaviour of the receivers in 
response to the new policies and Section 4 evaluates this behaviour in Santander and Barcelona. Section 5 compares 
the results obtained in these two cities with those found in NYC using OPD and, finally, section 6 presents the most 
important conclusions. 
2. Description of the analysis performed 
This paper studies the behaviour of goods receivers (retailers and hostelry) in response to the introduction of new 
urban goods distribution policies, specifically Off Peak Deliveries (OPD) and the use of Urban Distribution Centres 
(UDC) for goods. The first of these policies uses the off peak distribution of goods (OPD) which aims to transfer the 
distribution of some goods from rush hour to night time (between 22:00 and 6:00) whilst taking remedial measures to 
counter any irritation to both residents and business. 
The second of the collaborative transport system policies being analysed uses urban goods distribution centres 
(UDC). This policy encourages the arrival of goods at the distribution centres during the night time and from there the 
goods are delivered in smaller, preferably more environmentally friendly vehicles during commercial hours, thereby 
not only reducing traffic congestion at rush hour but also reducing pollution. Consideration is finally made of the 
current situation in urban goods distribution as the third policy to follow (this is really a policy of “inaction”). 
These policies will be presented to the receivers to consider their preferences under different scenarios because 
they are the ones who are really responsible for choosing how and when goods should be distributed in our towns and 
cities (Holguín-Veras et al., 2007; Holguín-Veras et al., 2008). The responses provided by the businesses will allow us 
to calculate how many and which of them would be willing to use each of the different policies. 
2.1. Choice of the relevant variables for each policy 
Many studies have tried to determine the most significant variables for different urban goods distribution policies 
(Marcucci and Danielis, 2008; NCFRP, 2010). A detailed study should be carried out in each case to determine the 
main variables affecting policies defined for each city as differences may exist from one place to another. The 
procedure will involve holding a series of interviews with various focus groups made up of people who are directly 
involved in the urban distribution of goods, i.e, distributors, carriers and businesses. Among other things, these 
interviews will be used to ask them which variables they think are the most important within each of the proposed 
policies. They will then be asked about the importance they would place on a series of variables which turned out to 
be significant in other studies from around the world (Holguín-Veras et al., 2007). 
The importance of the variables highlighted in the focus groups was confirmed by the stated preferences survey. 
Some of the variables were common to the two policies (for example, the amount of incentives provided for taking 
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part in the policies), while others were specific to each policy. Table 1 presents the variables which turned out to be 
most significant for the present study. Some of the variables were later divided into two or more dummy variables for 
reasons of functionality. 
 
Table 1. Relevant variables for the studied policies 
OPD UDC 
Tax incentive Tax incentive 
Goods delivery system Reduction of stock held on premises by having space available at UDC 
Goods delivery time table Distance between the UDC and the business 
 Goods delivery timetable 
2.2. Stated preferences survey presented to retailers 
An efficient design was used to correctly design the stated preferences survey, in order to maximise the information 
obtained from each choice situation. The efficiency was measured by using a measure which tries to minimise the 
error, the most commonly used in the literature is known as D-error (Bliemer and Rose, 2006), which uses the 
determinant of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. 
The results from the pilot survey (relevant variables and ‘a priori’ values of the parameters which improve the 
experimental design) were used to design the final stated preferences survey. The experimental design resulted in 12 
choice scenarios to be presented to each interviewee. Experience showed that to ask a stated preferences survey with 
too many scenarios is not a good idea (Pearmain et al., 1991; Sanko, 2001) because the interviewee tires and after a 
certain moment stops thinking about the answer (because they want to finish as quickly as possible). This problem 
was avoided by dividing the 12 scenarios into two balanced blocks of 6 scenarios so the interviews replied to the 
survey as accurately as possible. This method provided more trustworthiness to the replies. 
The advantage of stated preferences surveys is that given that each interviewee is presented with various scenarios 
in the same questionnaire (in this case 6 choice scenarios), a high number of questionnaires does not need to be 
collected to obtain a decent confidence level. Experience has demonstrated that for medium sized cities like Santander 
collecting 200 valid questionnaires is enough. This method provides 1200 different observations, although when 
estimating the mixed logit model consideration it must be considered repeated observations (only one policy can be 
chosen at a time). 
3. Model for predicting the behaviour of goods receivers 
As mentioned previously, a mixed logit model was used to model the results of the analysis as this type of model 
better adapts to the simulation of user behaviour (in this case, the retailers). These models are based on random utility 
theory (Domencich and McFadden, 1975). It needs to be pointed out that the mixed Logit model includes repeated 
observations as the data come from a stated preferences survey and, therefore, the interactions between the variables 
and the types of commercial activity have been included, as there is a suspicion of heterogeneity in the preferences of 
different commercial sectors. 
The definitive models were obtained from the completed model specification; they were then calibrated using 
simulation. A Halton sequence was chosen rather than the more typical Montecarlo simulation, because the pseudo 
random values have a more uniform distribution throughout the interval (Bhat, 2000). 
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3.1. Model of receiver behaviour in Santander 
The best model for Santander takes into account the main variables being considered, even though two of the OPD 
variables and another two from UDC were not significant, meaning they were excluded from the model. This model 
provided the following utility functions, in which the parameters are represented in lower case and the variables in 
upper case: 
 
U(OPD) = cOPD + taxOPD TAXOPD+ taxOPD,FO TAXOPD,FO + ciwOPD CIWOPD +cewOPD CEWOPD + ret1OPD RET1OPD
 
(1) 
U(UDC) = taxUDC TAXUDC + taxUDC,RH TAXUDC,RH + disUDC DISUDC + disUDC,TX DISUDC,TX + disUDC,FU DISUDC,FU(2) 
U(CUR) = cur (3) 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation of the ML model with repeated observations and interaction between the variables 
and the commercial activity. The table also shows the values of the standard deviation of the random estimated 
parameters. The software NLOGIT was used for calculating the models. 
Table 2. Best model for analysing the behaviour of goods receivers in Santander 
Variable Name Coefficient Test-t P[|Z|>z] 
Specific constant of the OPD alternative cOPD -3.0924 -5.822 0.0000 
Tax incentive offered to businesses to use the OPD alternative taxOPD 7.8999 2.589 0.0096 
Variable worth TAXOPD,FO = TAXOPD if the business is part of the food sector,  
0 in other cases 
taxOPD,FO 3.8652 1.105 0.3542 
Dummy variable, CIWOPD = 1 if the carriers unload the goods in a warehouse 
inside the business and  0 in other cases 
ciwOPD 1.4509 3.001 0.0027 
Dummy variable, CEWOPD = 1 if the carriers unload the goods at a warehouse 
outside the business and  0 in other cases 
cewOPD 1.8715 4.292 0.0000 
Dummy variable, RET1OPD = 1 if the business receives the goods at their 
premises between 22.00 and 24.00 and 0 in other cases 
ret1OPD 1.1166 2.284 0.0224 
Tax incentive offered to businesses to use the UDC alternative taxUDC 5.5290 4.262 0.0000 
Variable worth TAXUDC,RH = TAXUDC if the business belongs to the hostelry 
sector and 0 in other cases 
taxUDC,RH 8.3241 2.965 0.0030 
Distance from the UDC to the business disUDC -0.0005 -1.964 0.0496 
Variable worth DISUDC,TX = DISUDC if the business belongs to the textile sector 
and 0 in other cases 
disUDC,TX 0.0015 5.445 0.0000 
Variable worth DISUDC,FU = DISUDC if the business belongs to the furniture 
sector and 0 in other cases 
disUDC,FU 0.0083 1.857 0.0633 
Standard deviation of the variable DISUDC,FU Ns_disUDC,FU 0.0283 2.050 0.0404 
Specific constant of the alternative CUR cur 1.2466 7.118 0.0000 
Nº observations  1200   
Log-likelihood  -1020.372   
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3.2. Behaviour model for the receivers of goods in Barcelona 
In the case of Barcelona, it was noteworthy that none of the main variables for the OPD policy was significant in 
the best model, but their interactions with some business types were. This was because only a few specific 
commercial sectors accepted the policy. The best model has the following utility functions: 
 
U(OPD) = cOPD + taxOPD,FO TAXOPD,FO + ciwOPD,FO CIWOPD,FO +cewOPD,FO CEWOPD,FO + ret1OPD,FO RET1OPD,FO + 
ret3OPD,RH RET3OPD,RH + ret3OPD,FO RET3OPD,FO (4) 
U(UDC) = taxUDC,FU TAXUDC,FU + stoUDC STOUDC + disUDC DISUDC + schUDC,VA SCHUDC,VA (5) 
U(CUR) = cur (6) 
 
Table 3. Best model for analyzing the behavior of receivers of goods in Barcelona 
Variable Name Coefficient Test-t P[|Z|>z] 
Specific constant of the OPD alternative cOPD -3.5985 -9.441 0.0000 
Variable worth TAXOPD,FO = TAXOPD (tax incentive offered for using the OPD 
alternative) if the business belongs to the food sector  and 0 in other cases 
taxOPD,FO 6.5835 1.775 0.0759 
Dummy variable, CIWOPD,FO = 1 if the business belongs to the food sector and 
the carriers deliver the goods to a warehouse inside the business premises and 
0 in other cases 
ciwOPD,FO 2.5203 5.188 0.0000 
Dummy variable, CEWOPD,FO = 1 if the business belongs to the food sector and 
the carriers deliver the goods to a warehouse outside the business premises and 
0 in other cases 
cewOPD,FO 2.5398 4.931 0.0000 
Dummy variable, RET1OPD,FO = 1 if the business belongs to the food sector  
and the carriers deliver the goods to the premises between 22.00 and 24.00 and 
0 in other cases 
ret1OPD,FO 1.9469 2.973 0.0030 
Dummy variable, RET3OPD,RH = 1 if the business belongs to the hostelry sector 
and the carriers deliver the goods to the premises between 4.00 and 6.00 and 0 
in other cases 
ret3OPD,RH 1.5871 2.015 0.0439 
Dummy variable, RET3OPD,RH = 1 if the business belongs to the food sector 
and the carriers deliver the goods to the premises between 4.00 and 6.00 and 0 
in other cases 
ret3OPD,FO 1.7889 2.712 0.0067 
Variable worth TAXUDC,FU = TAXUDC (tax incentive offered to the business for 
using the UDC alternative) if the business belongs to the furniture sector and 0 
in other cases 
taxUDC,FU 11.5315 2.693 0.0071 
Reduction of stock held in the business warehouse because space is available 
for storage at the UDC 
stoUDC 1.4030 1.956 0.0505 
Variable worth SCHUDC,VA = SCHUDC (timetable for distribution from the UDC 
to the business) if the business is non-specialist retail and 0 in other cases 
schUDC,VA 1.4214 2.444 0.0145 
Distance from the UDC to the business disUDC -0.0235 -6.148 0.0000 
Standard deviation of the variable DISUDC Ns_disUDC 0.0328 7.131 0.0000 
Specific constant of the CUR alternative cur 0.2154 0.763 0.4456 
Nº observations  1200   
Log-likelihood  -725.1   
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Table 3 shows the estimation of the best ML model with repeated observations and interaction between the 
variables and the type of commercial activity. 
4. Behaviour of the receivers of goods in Santander and Barcelona 
After finding the model able to predict the response of businesses to the different policies being studied, various 
scenarios need to be proposed in order to evaluate the degree of acceptance of each policy. It should initially be 
pointed out that the policies will be studied separately, in other words, the degree of acceptance of each one of the 
policies will be evaluated for each of the proposed scenarios. The reason for this is that it does not appear reasonable 
to simultaneously introduce a night time goods distribution policy at the same time as using an urban distribution 
centre, because, in the latter the main movement of goods (bringing them to the cities) is also made during the night. 
Therefore, the scenarios being studied must be established for both the OPD policy and for the urban goods 
distribution centres. 
4.1. Behaviour of receivers of goods with the OPD policy 
Different levels can be established for the variables which intervene in the utility function of nocturnal distribution. 
Three levels have been considered for the tax incentives, these were offered as a reduction in the taxes that the 
business has to pay to the administration: no incentives (0%), 5% and 10%. The method by which the goods are 
delivered is simulated from the dummy variables considered in the model, one of them takes the value of 1 and the 
others take 0. 
For Santander, it was necessary to consider the particular case of the food sector where the incentives affected more 
than in other sectors. All of the above results in a total of 15 scenarios (5 levels for tax incentives, 2 of them for food 
sector, and 3 ways for delivering the goods). Table 4 presents the percentage of businesses using the OPD policy in 
Santander for each of the scenarios being considered. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of businesses willing to use the OPD in Santander for each scenario considered 
 CIWOPD = 1 CEWOPD = 1 RET1OPD = 1 
TAXOPD = 0% 5.28% 7.82% 3.83% 
TAXOPD = 5% 7.63% 11.18% 5.59% 
TAXOPD,FO = 5% 9.11% 13.25% 6.70% 
TAXOPD = 10% 10.93% 15.74% 8.07% 
TAXOPD,FO = 10% 15.30% 21.57% 11.45% 
 
In Barcelona there are 4 possible ways of delivering goods, considering the same 3 levels of tax incentives 
described above as well as interaction between the variables and two commercial sectors (food and hostelry). 
Nevertheless, given that the mode of delivering goods has no influence for commerce in general and for the hostelry 
sector the only interaction was found when deliveries are made between 4:00 and 6:00 requiring the presence of the 
manager, 6 different methods of delivery were considered (as shown in table 5). A total of 18 different scenarios are 
considered and Table 5 shows the percentage of businesses using the OPD policy in Barcelona for each of them. 
The results obtained show how as the fiscal incentive increases the businesses are more willing to adopt the OPD 
policy. This is more so in Santander (in Barcelona the incentive only has a positive effect for the food sector). 
Similarly, the businesses are more willing to use the OPD policy if it is the haulier that places the goods into their 
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storage facility without requiring the physical presence of an employee of the business (whether this is external 
storage or inside the business premises). 
 
Table 5. Percentage of businesses using OPD in Barcelona for each scenario considered 
 General CIWOPD,FO = 1 CEWOPD,FO = 1 RET1OPD,FO = 1 RET3OPD,RH = 1 RET3OPD,FO = 1 
TAXOPD = 0% 2.16% 21.52% 21.85% 13.39% 9.74% 11.66% 
TAXOPD = 5% 2.16% 27.87% 28.26% 17.88% 9.74% 15.68% 
TAXOPD = 10% 2.16% 35.25% 35.69% 23.48% 9.74% 20.76% 
 
The use of incentives in the food sector is particularly interesting in Santander, because it is possible to increase by 
between 2% and 6% (depending on the way of delivering goods) the number of businesses willing to accept the policy 
compared to the other commercial sectors. 
In Barcelona, however, the way goods are delivered only has an influence in the food and hostelry sectors. The use 
of warehouses is particularly interesting in the food sector, because an additional 8% to 15% of business can be 
encouraged (depending on the tax incentives and whether or not the delivery time requires the presence of a staff 
member) to use the OPD policy compared with the case where the business has to receive the goods during the night. 
4.2. Behaviour of receivers with the UDC policy 
As with the case presented above, the UDC policy will consider three levels of fiscal incentives: no incentives 
(0%), 5% and 10%. Three levels will also be considered for different distances between the UDC and the business: 
short distance (80 m.), medium distance (350 m.) and long distance (750 m.). 
As in the case of Santander interaction exists between the variables and the businesses in the food and hostelry 
sectors, the textile sector and the furniture sector, the same three levels will be considered exclusively for each of 
these commercial sectors. This makes a total of 12 distance levels (3 for all the businesses and three for each specific 
sector). 
Therefore, a total of 36 scenarios (3 levels of tax incentive and 12 distance levels between the UDC and the 
business) are considered for Santander. Table 6 presents the percentage of businesses which use the UDC policy for 
each one of the scenarios being considered. 
 
Table 6. Percentage of businesses using the UDC in Santander  for each scenario considered 
 80 m. 350 m. 750 m. 
 Gen. 
(%) 
RH 
(%) 
TX 
(%) 
FU 
(%) 
Gen. 
(%) 
RH 
(%) 
TX 
(%) 
FU 
(%) 
Gen. 
(%) 
RH 
(%) 
TX 
(%) 
FU 
(%) 
TAXUDC = 0% 21.63 21.63 23.77 41.36 19.40 19.40 29.10 55.89 16.43 16.43 38.15 58.59 
TAXUDC = 5% 26.68 35.56 29.14 45.18 24.09 32.49 35.12 56.98 20.58 28.21 44.85 59.10 
TAXUDC = 
10% 
32.43 52.45 35.15 49.04 29.50 49.03 41.64 58.05 25.47 43.99 51.74 59.60 
 
In the case of Barcelona interaction exists between the variables and the businesses in the furniture sector and the 
non-specialist retailers. However, as the incentive only influences the furniture sector three levels will be considered 
for the distance between the UDC and the business (short, medium and long distance) as well as three levels for the 
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reduction of stock held on the business premises as a result of having space available at the UDC: no reduction (0%), 
30% and 60%. 
These 9 scenarios are provided for: general commerce, the furniture sector with two levels of incentives (5% and 
10%, the zero incentives case is the same as for general commerce) and for the case where the delivery from the UDC 
to the none specialist retailer is made in the morning (for the afternoon delivery the case is identical to that of general 
commerce). Thereby making a total of 36 scenarios addressed in Barcelona. Table 7 shows the percentage of 
businesses that use the UDC policy in Barcelona for each of the scenarios that were considered. 
Table 7. Percentage of businesses using the UDC in Barcelona  for each scenario considered 
 General TAXUDC,FU = 5% TAXUDC,FU = 10% SCHUDC,VA = 1 
 80m. 
(%) 
350m. 
(%) 
750m. 
(%) 
80m. 
(%) 
350m. 
(%) 
750m. 
(%) 
80m. 
(%) 
350m. 
(%) 
750m. 
(%) 
80m. 
(%) 
350m. 
(%) 
750m. 
(%) 
STOUDC = 
0% 
25.34 23.41 23.50 31.51 24.95 24.22 38.25 26.55 24.96 41.53 27.32 25.31 
STOUDC = 
30% 
29.78 24.53 24.03 36.38 26.12 24.76 43.43 27.75 25.50 46.80 28.53 25.85 
STOUDC = 
60% 
34.55 25.68 24.56 41.50 27.31 25.30 48.73 28.98 26.05 52.13 29.77 26.41 
A comparison of the results from Santander and Barcelona for the uptake of the UDC policy shows how the 
distance between the UDC and the business has a negative, although not excessively important, effect on uptake. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that because they consider it a negative factor in their immediate area and they 
don’t use it much, the businesses in the textile and furniture sectors in Santander prefer the UDC to be located further 
away from their premises. 
It is also worth noting that while in Santander the level of the tax incentives being offered has a considerable effect 
on policy uptake in Barcelona it has hardly any effect (except in the furniture sector). Furthermore, being offered their 
own storage space at the UDC has a considerable effect on the businesses in Barcelona, whereas in Santander it has no 
importance. This is because in Barcelona the price of real estate is very high making it is economically beneficial to 
reduce storage space to a minimum, which is not so important in Santander. 
It is also worth pointing out that better value for money would be obtained by concentrating resources on certain 
commercial sectors. In Santander the UDC would be better located closer to the businesses in the hostelry sector, 
while it could be further away from businesses in the textile and furniture sectors. So by giving tax incentives to 
businesses to encourage them to take up this policy, it would be more efficient to concentrate the effort on the hostelry 
sector or on the textile sector rather than on general commerce, and it would not be very beneficial to provide 
incentives to the furniture sector. 
In Barcelona it would be interesting to correctly plan the distribution from the UDC to the businesses, especially 
the non specialist retail business and much more to the businesses closest to the UDC, given that if the deliveries are 
made during the morning, uptake can be increased by up to 18%. 
Finally, if in the case of Barcelona it is decided to provide tax incentives for using the UDC, these should be given 
exclusively to the furniture sector (they would have no effect in the other sectors), and especially to the businesses 
closest to the UDC, among which at the very least uptake of the policy could be increased by 6%. 
5. Comparison of the results with those of NYC for OPD 
A similar investigation was carried out in NYC (Holguín-Veras et al., 2007; Holguín-Veras et al., 2008), in which 
the behaviour of both the goods carriers and the goods receivers was analysed in response to a policy aimed at 
increasing goods distribution during off peak hours. The research used discrete choice models to model their 
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behaviour using data collected in a stated preferences survey. The policy encouraged the receivers to get involved by 
offering tax incentives and reduced delivery costs for the companies that were prepared to accept off-peak deliveries. 
The research found that the tax incentives offered to the receivers in NYC increased their acceptance of the OPD 
policy; however the effect was much more noticeable in some specific commercial sectors (wood/lumber, alcohol, 
paper, medical supplies, printed material, and food). A similar result was found in Santander, where the tax incentives 
provided to the food sector had a greater effect on uptake than with other sectors. In Barcelona, however, the tax 
incentives had no influence on the receivers at all, except in the food sector. 
Some of the variables that were significant in the NYC model were not so in the Spanish cities (no access to 
building/freight entrance after hours, additional costs to the business if accepting more OPD), given that the problem 
of access to building did not exist initially, and the existence of additional receiver costs due to OPD was not 
significant (the receivers assumed these costs as implicit when the delivery required their presence on the premises). 
These results show that, irrespective of the city, the food sector is very willing to participate in OPD policies and 
especially if there are tax incentives involved. Therefore, similarly to what happened in NYC where a successful pilot 
test was run with ample receiver participation with the OPD policy, it would be interesting to have a similar pilot test 
in other cities such as Santander and Barcelona, where it has already been shown that there could be a high level of 
receiver acceptance. 
It would also be beneficial to develop similar practical cases to test the use of UDC, as it has already been shown 
that in Santander and Barcelona the degree of acceptance of this policy is greater than for OPD, even when the 
receivers are not offered any tax incentives. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has presented the results of research carried out in the Spanish cities of Santander and Barcelona to 
evaluate the response of goods receivers in urban areas to different policies for delivering the final mile in logistics 
chains: OPD and using UDC. These results have been compared with those obtained in NYC for the OPD policy. 
It was generally found that receivers are against changing the way they get their goods delivered, especially if this 
involves any additional cost (either in time or money). Nevertheless, with the correct planning, helped at times with 
tax incentives for receivers willing to take up the policy, a certain degree of acceptance can be achieved, especially in 
certain commercial sectors. 
So, while in Santander up to 7.82% of receivers can be convinced to use OPD without any tax incentives fewer 
were willing to participate in Barcelona (2.16%). If, however, effort was concentrated on certain specific commercial 
sectors then greater degrees of acceptance could be achieved still without incentives (21.85% in the food sector in 
Barcelona). Clearly, these values would increase if incentives were offered, however such incentives are complicated 
in times of crisis and perhaps more realistic scenarios should be considered. 
A comparison of these results with those obtained in NYC shows how tax incentives are a useful measure to 
increase uptake of the OPD policy. However, these incentives should not be handed out randomly because certain 
commercial sectors have been shown to be more willing to respond to them. For the two Spanish cities studied, as 
well as for NYC, the food sector has proved to be, without doubt, the ideal sector on which to provide tax incentives 
for accepting the OPD policy. 
However, receiver acceptance of the UDC is affected by more variables, such as their distance from the 
commercial premises (which generally has a negative effect on acceptance) or the possibility of having their own 
storage space at the UDC which would allow them to reduce their stock on their own premises (this variable was only 
influential in Barcelona where real estate prices are so high that it is very expensive to have storage space on 
commercial urban land). 
If the receivers could be guaranteed having a UDC at least 750 metres from their premises, without providing any 
incentives 16.43% of the receivers in Santander (and even 38.15% and 58.59% of the textile sector and furniture 
sector, respectively) and 23.50% of those of Barcelona could be convinced to use them. Clearly, with the use of tax 
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incentives, above all in Santander, more receivers would be willing to try the system (in Barcelona this would only be 
true for the furniture sector). Furthermore, if the receivers in Barcelona were offered their own storage area at the 
UDC more of them would accept the policy, even more with a greater reduction in stock held on their premises. This 
influence would be even greater at shorter distances (if the UDC were less than 80 metres, then 5% more receivers 
would be willing to use the policy). 
Finally, the non-specialist retailers would be more willing to use the UDC if they had the guarantee that they could 
receive their goods during the morning. This effect is greater the closer the UDC gets to their premises (at shorter 
distances than 80 metres policy acceptance increases by 16%). 
Sound planning of UFD policies is very important. Targeting the incentives on certain specific commercial sectors 
which are more willing to change along with the correct planning of the necessary infrastructure (location and 
equipment) and the running of the centres (time tables, delivery methods, etc.) would result not only in cleaner, 
healthier cities with lower congestion, it would also optimise the use of available resources. 
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